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POINT I
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED
PETITION DATED DECEMBER l, 1975 WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER FROM
WHICH APPEAL COULD BE TAKEN.
The order of partial dismissal of petitioner's amended
petition dated December 1, 1975, granted in part and denied
in part a motion to dismiss petitioner's amended petition
with regard to a petition comprised of seven (7) counts for
relief, four (4) under conduct and three (3) under condition
alleged to be seriously detrimental to the child.
This Court observed In Re Fullmer 17 Utah 2d 121, 405
P. 2d 343 (1965) with regard to a complaint comprised of 8
causes of action wherein the Court dismissed the first cause
of action and denied a motion to dismiss with regard to counts
2 through 8, from which partial judgment of dismissal the
appeal was taken, with both parties treating it as an appeal
from a final judgment, as follows:
It is from the foregoing judgment that defendant
appeals. Although treated as such by both parties,
this is not a final judgment from which an appeal
may be taken.
The instant case might well have been entertained
as an appeal from an interlocutory order or decision.
However, defendant, did not see fit to follow that
procedure.
A case cannot be brought to this Court in
fragments, and this appeal, not being from a final
judgment, must be dismissed.
Therefore, since the order of December 1, 1975 dismissed only three (3) of seven (7) counts for relief and
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the Court denied the motion to dismiss with regard to the
remaining four (4) counts, the order of partial dismissal
was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPmmENT Is
MOTION TO DISMISS THE REMAINDER IJF PETITIONER'S AMENDED
PETITION BEFORE THE CLOSE OF PETITIONER'S CASE IN CHIEF.
A.

THE CHILD l:l..AS A RIGHT TO A 110RY..AL LIFE A:m

EVIDE:iCE BEARING ON THAT RIGHT SHOULD HA VE
P?,ESE:TTED r:l FULL TO THE COURT BEFORE IT
MOTION TO

BEE~l

GRA:~TED

A

DIS~ISS.

Dr. Cutler testified that the natural father was
functioning in the adult dull normal range but that in
school oriented areas, the areas which .
learnings from school and the vocabulary and
knowledse function, a general range of knowledge,
he's functioning at about 75 IO, which is
borderline mental ~efective. (P. 146 L. 31-34
and P. 147 L. 1-3.)
In addition, Dr. Cutler stated that the father of
the child has an extreme amount of misinformation and
lack of inforr:lation even for the relatively low level
of function as follows:

...

He thinks the canital ofltaly is Spain (P. 147 L. 11-12.)
Dr. Cutler testified that in addition to the
intelligence level l')roble!!'I., that the father has what
is ca~led a characterological tryve of disorder, the
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basic motivation to such being hostility.

lie testified

t~t

characterological hostility is acted out in amoral and
asocial behavior stating that people with this
characterological disorder don't see that what they
do as wrong.

( See P. 148, L. 24-29)

Dr. Cutler stated that the natural father had
(See P. 149, L. 21-32)

a very high lie score.

The doctor stated that the child as tested had
an IQ of 105 and already showed signs of deterioration
in function.
When asked about what effect the home situation
would be on the child with regard to its learning
and development if it were to reside in a home where
the step-mother was functioning within the mental
defective range with a full scale IO of 67 and the
father functioning in general range of knowled8e at 75
IQ, which is borderline mental defective, and where
the child would be residin8 with five children of the
step-mother from two previous marriages, all of whom
have had problems with education at one time or another
and been in special education classes would this composite
Picture have a detrimental effect on the learning

and

development of the child, Dr. Cutler observed as follows:
"I can very definitely say more so than just
the father's structure alone, the mother being
mentally defective and the mentallv retarded
children, the total innut is even more restricted
b~cause the mother is going to have more to do
with the child than the father.
Usuallv the
father is out working and this could lead to
severe deprivation I think psychologically and
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intellectually." (P. 162 L. 31-33 and P. 163 L. 1-5.)
When the doctor was asked if in his opinion with
the father being significantly lower in intelligence
than the child whether it was more probable than not that
the child would not develop to his Potential if custody
were to remain with the father, the doctor answered as
follows:
That is certainly my oPinion.

(See P. 165, L.2)

And when the doctor was asked as follows:
Would it be vour oninion that with the father's
present wife and- five children from two previous
marriages who are significantly lower in intelligence
than the child, that it would be more probable than
not that the child would not develop to his
potential if he were to continue to reside with the
mother and these five siblings?
The doctor answered as follows:
Very much so I would say.

(See P. 165, L. 9)

Eased on the testimony of an independent psychologist
who was asked to examine the step-mother at the request of
counsel for the father, Virgil W. Brockbank, in his
report, observed as follows:
The issue of course in terms of her intelligence
would be: can she orovide the adeCTuate stimulation
as well as adeauate care for this child of normal
intelligence? 'rt is unlikely that the combination
of this mother and father would be sufficient to
Drovide the bov with the skills most necessarv to
his adenuate a3~ustment in life . . . The bov will
undoubted1v sut~er some decrement in intellectual
tunctionins trorn the lack of stimulation with these
2arents
/:r:rnphasis aded.]
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The Court did not, on any occasion, either during
the numerous hearings or during the trial itself have
an opportunity to see either the father or the stepmother as they did not appear.

Neither of these

persons testified in Court and the Court had no
opportunity to observe their demeanor or f,eneral attitude.
Based on the type of strong evidence heretofore
set forth, the attorney for the child, Michael Stead,
desired further and more detailed evidence and this
evidence would have come out on the second day of trial
if the Court had not granted the Motion to Dismiss.
B.

THE PLAIN

~rnG

OF RULE 23 OF THE UTAH

JUVENILE COURT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDL'RE, WHICH
IMPLEMENTED THE mTENT OF 55-10-84, NOW 78-3a-25 L'. c .A .
.A..T\lNOTATED AS AMENDED DICTATES THAT ONCE A CASE HAS
GONE TO TRIAL THE PETITION SHALL NOT BE

DISt~ISSED

UNTIL THE CLOSE OF THE PETITIONER'S CASE.
Rule 23 of the Utah Juvenile Court Rules of
Practice and Procedures reads as follows:
The Court may at any time during, or at the
conclusion of any hearing, dismiss a petition and
terminate the proceedings related to the child if
such action is in the interest of ·ustice and the
we are o t e c 1
an t e Court s a
<lismiss anv
Petition which has not been oroven.
[ Emnhas is added ·
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The above rule provides that while the Court may
dismiss an action during or at the conclusion of any
hearing,

it may not dismiss a petition until the

?etitioner has an opportunity to prove his case.

This

cannot be done until the close of petitioner's case
and this is the sensible and plain meaninF, of the
statute.
Anything less would be incompatible with the
plain meaning of the foregoing rule for the following
reasons:
1.

First, a dismissal during the trial itself

would not be a dismissal "during or at the conclusion
of a hearing", as the same denotes something less
than a motion in mid-trial, such as a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or a Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Once the matter has gone to trial, a Motion
to Dismiss should not be granted until petitioner has
completed his case in chief and has not proven his case.
2.

Second, to dismiss a case where the Court has

alreadv denied an identical motion for the reason that,
as stated by the Court,
(f'.

179 L.

"'~r.

Goodwill had not rested,"

7-9) would not be in the "interest of justice"
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j

within the meaning of the rule as that phrase dictates
that petitioners have their day in Court.
3.

Third, such an action could not be in the

"welfare of the child" within the meaning of the foregoing rule, for a decision was made in this case without
the Court even once seeing or hearing from the natural
father or step-mother, and without receiving testimony
from Dr. Victor B. Cline, the psychologist the Court
ordered to examine the child and who made the observation
with regard to the threatened castration by the
C.

THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE WHICH

step-~other.

LMPLEME~-l"TED

THE STATUTE IN OUESTION WOULD ACCORD A PETITIONER THE
SAME TREATMENT OF FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY PETITIONER
WOULD RECEIVE IF THE CASE HAD BEEN HEARD IN DISTRICT
COURT.
If the case had been heard in District Court and
the District Court at the time for hearing the Writ of
Habeas Corpus had not certified the question to the
Juvenile Court the Rules of Civil Procedure would
undoubtedly have prevailed.
Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. provides:
After the plaintiff has completed the Presentation of his evidence, the defendant, witho~t waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion
is not granted, may move for a disnissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the nlaintiff
has shown no right to relief.
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Even i f this Court determines that Rule 4-1 (b),
U.R.C.P. does not apply specifically to the foregoing
issue, it is submitted that the purpose of Rule 23
implementing the foregoing statute is in confon:lity
with the spirit and meaning of Rule 4l(b) and therefore
the Motion to Dismiss prior to the close of Petitioner's
case was premature and the order based thereon should
be vacated and set aside.
D.

TO INTERPR.f.T THE STATUTE AS

BY COillISEL FOR RESPONDENT WOULD BE A

!~ARR.OWLY
DE~HAL

AS L'RGED

OF THE DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article 1 Section 7 of the Due Process Clause of
the Utah constitution provides as follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
In Jensen v. Union Pacific
21 P. 994,

~·

Co, 6 U. 2d 253,

(1889), it is observed as follows:

Manv definitions have been attmepted, but it
is believed that they all come to this citation,
which means that a party shall have his day in
Court, --trial; which Tieans the right of each
party, plaintiff and defendant, to introduce
evidence to establish his right to recover on
the one hand, and to establish his defense
upon the part of the other; after which comes
judgment.· Any judgment which is rendered
without these modes of procedure, or in 2isregard
of them, is not "due process of law."
Any
other procedure condemns before it hears, does not
proceed upon in~uirv, but renders judgment before
trial.
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In
314,

Christiansen~·

(1945),

Harris, 109 Q.

l,

163 P.

2d

it is observed as follows:
apparently

If Rule 23, which was passed to implement 55-10-84,
now 78-3a-25 U.C.A. annotated

as amended, were construed

to mean that a petition could be discissed at any time
and under any circumstances without regard to the rights
of a petitioner who has spent considerable time and money
paying for Court ordered psychological examinations and
for expert witnesses to appear and prepare to appear in
trial, and to specifically permit the Court to dismiss
a petition before the close of petitioner's case and over
the objection of independent counsel for the child,

then

the statute and the rule in question are void as being a
denial of due process within the meaning of Article 1
Section 7 of the Utah constitution.
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The minor child's right to a normal life and to
develop normally would likewise be frustrated by such
a narrow construction of the foregoing Rule.

If Rule

23 as it implements 55-10-84, now 73-3a-25 U.C.A.
annotated as amended, were construed to mean that once
justiciable issues of fact are raised with regard to
the rights of a minor child and the petition which
gives rise to such issues has survived a Motion to
Dismiss and the case has proceeded to trial that the
Court can dismiss the petition without giving petitioner
the full right to be heard and to introduce evidence to
establish his cause in his case in chief, said rule and
statute would be void within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution.
POINT III
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DIS'I'RICT COURT RESULTED PT AN ORDER CERTIFYING THE CASE TO
THE JUVEtnLE COURT WITH DIRECTIONS THAT IT MAKE FINDINGS
A:ID AN ORDER WITH P.EGARD TO CUSTODY ~TD REFER THE MATTER
BACK TO DISTRICT COURT FOR FINAL HEARING ON THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
Following the death of the naternal grandmother,
temporary custodian of the child and joint petitioner
herein, the Juvenile Court, on April 1, 1975, entered
an order providing for temporary custody and guardianship
in the natural father subject to the protective supervision
of

t~e

~ivision

of Family Services as follows:
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I~ IS ORDERED THATTHf. ABOVE-NAMED CHILD BE
RETT'RNED TO THE TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND GUARDIA;JSHIP
OF THE FATHER, SUBJECT TO THE PRO!ECTIVE SUPERVISIOti
OF THE DIVISION OF FAMILY S":RVICES, PE:'1DING TRIAL
OF THE ABOVE MATTER, AND THE DIVISION OF FAMILY
SERVICES IS DIRECTED TO EFFECT THE TRANSFER OF THE
ABOVE-~1AMED CHILD FROM THE AUNT, JANET STO\.JELL, TO
THE FATHER, AFOREMENTIONED, WITHIN 24 HOURS HEREOF.

Dated this 1st day of April 1975.
BY THE COURT:

/SI John Farr Larson
JUDGE
The child had never been in the legal custody of
the father.

In the divorce action custody was awarded to

the child's mother.

After the death of the child's mother,

the Juvenile Court awarded temporary custody to the joint
petitioner, the child's maternal grandmother, and following
the death of the maternal grandmother the Juvenile Court
placed temporary custody of the child with the natural
father.
On March 21, 1975, a hearing on the father's Writ
of Habeas Corpus was held in the District Court resulting
in an order which directed the Juvenile Court, among
other things, as follows:
1. The question of the custody of the minor child,
Douglas Rex Izatt, is certified to the District
Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake Countv for
determination pursuant to 55-10-78 C.C.A. as
amended.
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2.
That the Writ of Habeas Corpus herein is
continued without date.
3.
That follm1ing the
hearing in Juvenile
Court, the Juvenile Court shall ~ake findings and
an order with re ard to custody and refer the matter
e Di rict ourt . or a ina
earina on
e
Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . [Emphasis added.
The statute under which the District Court proceeded
to make its ruling on the Writ of Habeas Corpus is clear
and unambiguous in scope wherein it is observed in 78-3a-17,
formerly 55-10-73, U.C.A. annotated as follows:
~Tothing contained in this act shall deprive
the District Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a
~uardian for a child nor of jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child upon Writ of Habeas
Corpus when the question of custody is incidental
to the determination of a cause in the District
Court; provided that in case a petition involving
the same child is endin in the Juvenile Court or
t e Juveni e Court s previous y acquire continuing jurisdiction over the same child, the District
Court shall certify the question of custody to the
Juvenile Court for determination.

A District Court may at any time decline to
pass upon a question of custody and may certify
that uestion to the Juvenile Court for a determination or recommen ation.
Emp
The Juvenile Court by refusing to act and by doing
nothing more than dismissing petitioner's petition, in
effect, left the child in limbo with no permanent order
as to who should have the permanent legal custody of the
child.

On the date the Court entered its order of dismissal

there was nothing in effect but a temporary order of
custody in the natural father based on the jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court with regard to the petition which
the

Juveni~e

Court later dismissed.
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In addition, in making a temporary order

?lacin~

custody in the natural father before hearinf any
evidence and without ever seeing the natural father or
step-mother, the Court neglected to do what it was
directed to do by the District Court in the order of
March 21, 1975 wherein it was directed to make findings
and an order with regard to custody.
The Juvenile Court cannot do more nor less than the
statute and order under which it was directed to proceed.
When the matter was certified to the Juvenile Court with
directions to make findings and an order with regard to
custody and refer the matter back to the District Court
that is precisely what the Juvenile Court should have
done.
By failing so to do the Juvenile Court acted
contrary to law and the order of dismissal is invalid.
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POINT IV
THERE HAS ;m WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR
THE CIIILD AND TEE CHILD WAS ~JOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
AT THE HEARING DURING WHICH THE PETITIO~T WAS DISHISSED.
A.
~lOT PRESE~T

THE CHILD'S APPOINTED COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS
ON THE DATE THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS HEARD.

The Juvenile Court may appoint, on its own motion,
counsel to represent the child if it is necessary to
protect the interests of the child as is observed in
78-Ja-3:, formerly 55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated as
amended as follows:
. . . The Court may appoint counsel without
such reouest if it deems representation bv counsel
necessary to orotect the interests of the child or
of other parties.
Pursuant to the foregoing statute, the Court
appointed ~~ichael Stead as attorney for the child and
in that capacity, at the conclusion of the first day of
trial, he opposed the mid-trial motion to dismiss
oetitioner's amended petition as it related to the
mental and emotional condition of the father and
steo-mother, the threats of castration by the stepmother and the great disparity in intelligence between
the child and the natural father, and between the child
and the step-mother and steo-siblin3s.
The Cour: denied the motion to dismiss as it
related to the aforesaid claims.
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Michael Stead, the attorney for the child, had
vigorously sought to bring out the issues relating
to the mental and emotional condition of the father
and step-mother and joined petitioner's counsel in a
motion which resulted in an order that the child, the
natural father and the step-mother should submit to
psychological examinations.
On the day set for the second day of trial, the
Court permitted counsel for the father once again to
renew his Motion to Dismiss and at the same time the
Court appointed John Soltis, a Deputy County attorney,
as guardian ad litem for the child.
The Court at that time had not received a withdrawal
of counsel from Michael Stead, attorney for the child,
and the Court did not appoint John Soltis to act as
attorney for the child.
Since the Court had previously appointed counsel
to represent the child, deeming it to be in the best
interests of the child that it be represented by counsel,
and counsel for the child was not present to protect
the child's interests on the date the second motion to
dismiss was heard, it was not proper to proceed to hear
the Motion to Dismiss and the order based thereon is
invalid.
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B.

'I'HF.

AS GUARDIAN AD

APPOI~~TI1ENT
LITE~

OF A DEPUTY COillTTY ATTORNEY

rOR THE CHILD WAS IMPROPER AS ACCORD-

DG TO UTAH LAW THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IS DESIGNATED
TO

REPRESE~TT

THE STATE IN ANY PROCEEDINGS

CONCER..~ING

A

CHILD.

In 78-3a-35, for1T1erly 55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated
as

a~ended,

it is observed as follows:

The Court may appoint counsel without
such request if it deems representation by
counsel necessary to protect the interests of the
child or of other parties. If the child and other
parties were not represented by counsel, the Court
shall inform them at the conclusion of the proceedings that they have the right to appeal.
The Countv Attorne
in any orocee ings in a

the State

The language of the foregoing statute is mandatory
as it dictates that the County Attorney shall represent
the State in a children's case and does not give discretion
to the Court with the use of the language employed with
regard to appointment of counsel wherein the same statute
states that the Court, "may appoint'' counsel to represent
the child.
Since the County Attorney's office is designated
by statute to represent the State of Utah in any children's

case, that same office cannot represent the child.
The foregoing statute provides that if the child
is not represented bv counsel, the Court shall infon!l the
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parties that they have a right to appeal at the conclusion
of the proceedings and that not having been done, and the
child not having been represented by counsel, the order
based on the motion to dismiss the petition is invalid
and should be vacated.
c.

THE GUA.llDIAN An LITEM DID

~mT

PROPERLY REPRE-

SENT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.

John Soltis was appointed guardian ad litem for
the child only moments before he joined in the father's
Second Motion to Dismiss the Petition and over the
objection of counsel for petitioners that the appointment
was not proper.
While counsel of record for the child, Michael Stead,
had been concerned about the mental and emotional wellbeing of the child if the child was permitted to remain
in the house of the natural father and wanted to hear more
evidence concerning that portion of the petition, the
guardian ad litem for the child, John Soltis, without
talking to petitioner's counsel, petitioner's expert
witnesses, the natural father or step-mother and without
having read the independent psychological on the stepmother, joined in the Second Motion to Dismiss.
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This partial behavior and careless action is, on
its face, not in the best interests of the child.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that the
Court can appoint a Deputy County attorney as guardian
ad litem to represent the child, rather than representing the State of Utah, all without notice to petitioner,
and without first obtaining a withdrawal of counsel
from the attorney of record for the child, if the
attorney apoointed as guardian ad litem for the child
does not act to protect the "interest of the child"
within the meaning of 78-3a-35, formerly 55-10-96, U.C.A.
annotated as amended, the child is substantively denied
the assistance of counsel, and a motion made by partial
and uninformed counsel should be vacated and set aside.
co~rcLUSION

The order of partial dismissal and the order
dismissing petitioners' petition in its entirety should
be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further
proceedings in order that the petitioners may complete
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is
completed, findings should be entered and a recommendation
~ace

to the uistrict Court for a final determination on
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the Writ of Habeas Corpus as it relates to the custody
issue.

GOODWILL
Attorney for Petitioners and
Aopellants Ben and Janet Stowe:.
4~~ E. 4th South, #SO
Salt Lake City, Utah 8~111
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